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ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE CLUB’S 
FREEDOM CLUB PAC V. BENNETT:  
MONEY TALKS, MATCHING  
FUNDS PROVISION WALKS 
Roya Rahmanpour* 
Money’s influence on politics has posed a problem for many 
jurisdictions. Arizona tried to combat this issue in part through the 
“matching funds” provision of its Clean Elections Act. This provision 
was part of a larger campaign-financing scheme; it allowed for 
additional campaign money to go to publicly financed candidates when 
the expenditures of their privately financed opponents and other 
independent groups collectively exceeded the initial funding that the 
state had provided to the publicly financed candidates. In Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that this matching funds provision violated the First 
Amendment. This Comment examines the Court’s ruling and argues that 
the Court’s disregard of empirical evidence, narrowing of the 
acceptable compelling state interests, and prioritization of individual 
speech over societal interests could lead to unprincipled decisions in 
the field of campaign finance and could cause campaign-finance 
deregulation. It further argues that the decision’s myopic analytic 
approach could bring about the piecemeal invalidation of intricate 
public-financing schemes and adversely impact policy decisions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As the adage goes, “Money talks.” And money, in the context of 
political campaigns, is a form of speech that the First Amendment 
protects.1 In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett,2 the U.S. Supreme Court considered this First Amendment 
right as applied to the “matching funds” provision of Arizona’s 
Clean Elections Act (the “Act”). This provision granted additional 
campaign money to publicly financed candidates when the 
expenditures of their privately financed opponents and other 
independent groups collectively exceeded the initial funding that the 
state had provided to the publicly financed candidates.3 The five-
member majority of the strongly divided Court held that this 
matching funds scheme violated the First Amendment.4 
This decision, which addressed the constitutionality of Arizona’s 
matching funds provision and the bounds of permissible public 
financing more generally, is an important addition to campaign-
finance jurisprudence for several reasons. First, Arizona Free 
Enterprise resolves a substantial circuit split regarding whether 
schemes like Arizona’s violate the First Amendment.5 Moreover, 
Arizona Free Enterprise marks the first case in which the Court has 
struck down a matching funds provision and is thus of great 
precedential value.6 As precedent, the decision renders other 
jurisdictions’ matching funds provisions and clean election laws 
 
 1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). 
 2. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). The Court consolidated this case with McComish v. Bennett. 
 3. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2816 (deciding the constitutionality of ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 16-952 (2011)). 
 4. Id. at 2813. 
 5. Compare McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free 
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), N.C. Right to Life Comm. 
Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008), and Daggett v. 
Comm’n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000) (each 
holding that matching funds to publicly financed candidates based on contributions and 
expenditures for privately financed candidates do not violate the First Amendment), with Scott v. 
Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010), Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 
2010), and Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994) (each holding similar laws 
unconstitutional). 
 6. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Union for Reform Judaism in Support of Respondents at 17, 
Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. 2806 (Nos. 10-238, 10-239), 2011 WL 661704, at *17. 
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more susceptible to constitutional attack.7 Moreover, the decision, 
which invalidated a key provision of the Arizona law, eliminates a 
workable public-financing model that other jurisdictions could have 
followed.8 
Part II of this Comment briefly summarizes the facts and 
procedural history of Arizona Free Enterprise. Part III then details 
the Court’s reasoning in arriving at its holding. Next, Part IV 
analyzes the decision by arguing that the Court’s disregard of 
empirical evidence, narrowing of the permissible compelling state 
interest, and prioritization of individual speech over societal interests 
can lead to campaign-financing deregulation and yield unprincipled 
decisions in the area of campaign-finance law. Part IV also argues 
that this decision’s myopic analytic approach leads to piecemeal 
invalidation of intricate public financing schemes and adversely 
impacts policy decisions. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF  
ARIZONA LAW AND  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Arizona Clean Elections Act implemented a completely 
voluntary public-financing system to fund the election campaigns of 
candidates for state office.9 Candidates who chose to participate 
(“publicly financed candidates”) were granted an initial allotment of 
public funds in exchange for accepting certain campaign restrictions 
and obligations.10 The state also granted participating candidates 
additional matching funds if the combined expenditures of their 
privately financed opponents and of other independent groups that 
supported the privately financed opponents exceeded the state’s 
 
 7. See, e.g., Melissa Griffin, San Francisco Election Financing Needs to Change, THE 
EXAMINER (June 28, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/2011/06/san-francisco-
election-financing-needs-change (explaining that in light of this case, San Francisco’s campaign 
financing system will have to change). 
 8. Through this decision “the U.S. Supreme Court took away the power of lawmakers on 
all levels of government to craft public campaign financing programs that best meet their needs.” 
Jessica A. Levinson, Justices Strike Down ‘Rescue Funds’ Provision in Public Campaign 
Financing Laws, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS, LOY. L. SCH., L.A. FAC. BLOG (July 1, 2011), 
http://llsblog.lls.edu/faculty/2011/07/justices-strike-down-rescue-funds-provision-in-public-
campaign-financing-laws.html#more. 
 9. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2813. 
 10. Id. at 2814 (referring to ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-941(A), -956(A)(2) (2006)) 
(stating that “publicly funded candidates” must agree to limit their expenditure of personal funds, 
participate in one debate, and adhere to an overall spending cap). 
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initial allotment to the participating candidates.11 The state issued 
these additional matching funds at a ratio of ninety-four cents for 
every dollar that the privately financed candidates and independent 
expenditure groups spent.12 The state capped matching funds to 
publicly financed candidates at three times13 the initial state 
allotment, at which point it stopped providing further matching funds 
even while it still required the participating candidate to refrain from 
private fundraising.14 Thus, a candidate who was able to raise funds 
in excess of three times the amount of a publicly financed 
candidate’s initial grant gained a potentially unlimited financial 
advantage by opting out of public funding.15 
Five past and future political candidates and two independent 
expenditure groups challenged the constitutionality of Arizona’s 
matching funds provision, arguing that the provision violated their 
First Amendment rights; they claimed that their fear of triggering 
matching funds to their publicly financed opponents caused them to 
curb their campaign fundraising or spending and therefore chilled 
their speech.16 The district court struck down the matching funds 
provision, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the 
provision imposed a minimal burden on speech and was justified by 
Arizona’s interest in curbing quid pro quo political corruption.17 The 
Supreme Court reversed again, holding that Arizona’s matching 
funds scheme violated the First Amendment rights of privately 
financed candidates and independent expenditure groups because it 
substantially burdened political speech and was not sufficiently 
justified by a compelling state interest.18 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. (noting that the six-percent deduction accounts for the privately financed candidate’s 
fundraising expenses). 
 13. The Court mistakenly wrote that the state capped matching funds at two times the 
allotment, but section 16-952(E) makes clear that the cap is three times the allotment. § 16-
952(E); Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2825. 
 14. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2814–15. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 2816. 
 17. McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2010 WL 2292213 (D. Ariz.), rev’d 
sub nom. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 18. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2828. 
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III.  REASONING  
OF THE COURT 
A.  The Majority’s Reasoning 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, struck down Arizona’s matching funds provision, 
first by finding that the provision severely burdened protected 
political speech—necessitating application of strict scrutiny—and 
then by determining that the provision was not justified by a 
compelling state interest.19 
1.  Whether the Matching Fund Provision  
Imposed a Substantial Burden on  
Privately Financed Candidates’ Speech 
The majority relied heavily on Davis v. FEC20 in deciding that 
the matching funds provision substantially burdened protected 
speech.21 Davis involved a First Amendment challenge to the 
“Millionaire’s Amendment” of the federal Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act, which called for an asymmetrical regulatory scheme if a 
candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives spent more than 
$350,000 of his personal funds.22 Under that asymmetrical scheme, 
when a candidate spent more than $350,000 of his personal funds, 
his opponent could collect individual contributions that amounted to 
three times the normal contribution limit.23 The Court in Davis found 
that the scheme burdened the self-funded candidate’s First 
Amendment rights because his expenditure of personal funds in 
excess of $350,000 enabled his opponent to raise more money and 
counteract his speech.24 
Likewise, the Arizona Free Enterprise majority reasoned that 
Arizona’s matching funds provision burdened speech because the 
privately financed candidate’s choice to raise or spend more than the 
state’s initial grant to his opponent publicly financed candidate 
triggered a state grant of additional funds to his opponent.25 The 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 21. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2817–18. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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majority then characterized the matching funds provision as a 
“penalty” that was constitutionally more problematic than the law in 
Davis
26 was because (1) an outright grant of matching funds was 
more burdensome than a raising of the contribution limits for one of 
the candidates was; (2) the matching funds provision could have 
created a multiplier effect in elections with multiple publicly 
financed candidates; and (3) the triggering of the matching funds 
may have been out of the privately financed candidate’s control 
because spending by independent expenditure groups could have also 
triggered matching funds.27 
Additionally, the majority determined that independent 
expenditure groups’ speech was burdened even more than that of 
privately financed candidates because these independent expenditure 
groups did not have the option of participating in Arizona’s public 
financing scheme.28 According to the majority, the Act burdened 
these groups by forcing them to choose among triggering a grant of 
matching funds, changing their message, or not speaking.29 
In the remainder of its burden analysis, the majority defended its 
reasoning in light of the dissent’s criticism.30 Countering the 
dissent’s view that the matching funds provision actually fostered 
more speech,31 the majority stated that any increased speech came at 
the expense of the privately financed candidate.32 The majority also 
stated that a privately financed candidate’s willingness to trigger the 
state’s grant of matching funds to his opponent did not make the law 
any less burdensome.33 As to the dissent’s evidentiary concern, the 
majority replied that proving a negative (i.e., that speech had been 
chilled) was not easy and cited Davis for the proposition that no 
empirical evidence was needed to determine that the law was 
burdensome.34 Finally, the majority reasoned that the constitutional 
infirmity of the provision was not the amount of funding that was 
triggered but rather the manner in which funding was triggered—
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 2818–19. 
 28. Id. at 2819–20. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 2820–24. 
 31. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 32. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2821. 
 33. Id. at 2823. 
 34. Id. 
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namely that it was triggered in response to the speech of privately 
financed candidates or independent expenditure groups.35 
2.  Whether a Compelling State Interest  
Justified the Matching Funds Provision 
Because the majority held that the Act imposed a substantial 
burden on protected speech, the majority applied strict scrutiny, 
which requires a compelling state interest to justify a law.36 The 
majority accepted the challengers’ contention that the matching 
funds provision impermissibly sought to equalize electoral 
opportunities rather than further the state’s alleged compelling 
interest of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.37 It 
found the operation of the provision and its legislative terminology 
of “equalizing funds” as evidence that the Act was an attempt to 
level the electoral playing field.38 
The majority further doubted that the Act had an anticorruption 
rationale because a candidate’s use of personal funds, without 
outside influence, also triggered a grant of matching funds.39 Finally, 
the majority expressed doubt about whether the matching funds 
provision provided any additional anticorruption value by noting that 
Arizona already had fundraising disclosure requirements and 
contribution limits that aimed to deter corruption.40 Thus, the Court 
held that Arizona’s matching funds provision was not justified by a 
compelling state interest and was therefore unconstitutional.41 
B.  The Dissent’s Reasoning 
Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined in a 
vigorous dissent in which they argued that the Act’s matching funds 
provision did not burden protected speech or that it was justified by 
the state’s compelling anticorruption interest.42 Before delving into 
 
 35. Id. at 2824. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 2825. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 2826. 
 40. Id. at 2827. 
 41. Id. at 2828–29. 
 42. Id. at 2829 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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their constitutional analysis, the dissenters first discussed the virtues 
and mechanics of Arizona’s public-funding scheme.43 
According to the dissent, Arizona’s political history revealed 
how ineffective contribution limits and disclosure requirements were 
in eliminating corruption; even with those regulations, the state  
suffered “AzScam,” one of the worst corruption scandals in Arizona 
history, where authorities caught nearly ten percent of the state’s 
legislators accepting bribes for political favors.44 As a result, the state 
enacted the public-funding scheme on top of its existing contribution 
limits and disclosure requirements.45 To make the scheme effective, 
Arizona crafted a “Goldilocks solution” to set the matching fund 
amount; the legislature set matching fund limits high enough in order 
to assure participating candidates that they could run competitive 
races, but not so high as to waste taxpayer dollars.46 Thus, after 
discussing the matching funds provision, the dissent moved on to 
analyze the provision’s constitutionality.47 
1.  Whether the Matching Fund Provision  
Imposed a Substantial Burden on  
Privately Financed Candidates’ Speech 
As the dissent stated, not only did the provision not burden 
protected speech but it also “subsidize[d] and so produce[d] more 
political speech.”48 The dissent noted that speech restrictions differ 
from speech subsidies and explained that “government subsidies of 
speech are consistent with the First Amendment so long as they do 
not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.”49 Since Arizona offered 
its public-financing program to all candidates regardless of their 
viewpoints, the dissent found no First Amendment violation.50 It 
explained that “Arizona . . . offers to support any person running for 
state office. Petitioners here refused that assistance. So they were 
making a novel argument: that Arizona violated their First 
 
 43. Id. at 2830–31. 
 44. Id. at 2832. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (describing the matching funds provision as an optimal means of calibrating public 
funds at just the right amount). 
 47. Id. at 2833. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 2834. 
 50. Id. at 2834–35. 
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Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other speakers even 
though they could have received (but chose to spurn) the same 
financial assistance.”51 Indeed, the dissent was outraged that the 
challengers to the law were essentially demanding a right to speak 
free from response.52 
Citing the seminal campaign finance case Buckley v. Valeo,53 the 
dissent also articulated that the majority was misguided in holding 
that a subsidy of electoral speech constituted a restraint on speech.54 
According to the dissent, a viewpoint-neutral subsidy of additional, 
responsive speech has never been seen as a First Amendment burden 
and is certainly not a “substantial” burden.55 Any burden that the 
matching funds provision imposed was no greater than the burden 
that is imposed by (1) a lump-sum public financing scheme; (2) 
disclosure and disclaimer requirements; or (3) contribution limits—
all of which the Court had previously upheld.56 
Additionally, the dissent distinguished Davis, which was the 
linchpin case in the majority’s reasoning.57 In Davis, the candidate’s 
expenditure triggered a “discriminatory speech restriction,” but in 
Arizona Free Enterprise, the candidate’s expenditure triggered a 
“non-discriminatory speech subsidy.”58 Furthermore, the dissent 
noted that Davis never called into question the trigger mechanism 
itself, but rather questioned the discriminatory speech restriction that 
the mechanism brought about.59 By distinguishing Davis, the dissent 
reiterated that Arizona’s matching fund provision did not impose a 
substantial burden on protected speech.60 
2.  Whether a Compelling State Interest  
Justified the Matching Funds Provision 
The dissent alternatively maintained that, even if the matching 
funds provision substantially burdened speech, it was justified by 
 
 51. Id. at 2835. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 54. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2836 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
1). 
 55. Id. at 2836–37. 
 56. Id. at 2837–39. 
 57. Id. at 2839–41. 
 58. Id. at 2839. 
 59. Id. at 2840. 
 60. Id. at 2839–41. 
  
666 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:657 
Arizona’s anticorruption rationale.61 Campaign-finance precedent 
squarely acknowledges the prevention of corruption or its appearance 
as a compelling state interest.62 
As evidence of the anticorruption interest that Arizona claimed, 
the dissent found instructive the formal findings of the public 
financing statute, which stated that the Act’s objective was to create 
a clean election system that functioned to limit the influence of 
special interest money in elections.63 The dissent also noted that 
Arizona’s history of corruption and the infamous AzScam scandal 
indicated that Arizona had a valid anticorruption rationale.64 Since 
the matching funds provision, as the “Goldilocks solution,” was 
integral to the effectiveness of Arizona’s pubic-financing program, 
the dissent attributed the state’s anticorruption rationale to that 
provision as much as it did to the entire program.65 
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority for characterizing 
Arizona’s real purpose in creating the provision as “‘level[ing] the 
playing field,’ not fighting corruption.”66 The dissent noted that the 
majority failed to present convincing evidence that the state’s interest 
was anything other than fighting corruption.67 Further, the dissent 
asserted that even if Arizona had sought to level the electoral playing 
field, as long as the state had a compelling interest—such as 
anticorruption—any separate interest in leveling the playing field 
would be irrelevant.68 Thus, the dissent would have upheld the 
matching funds provision as constitutional.69 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
This Comment argues that the Arizona Free Enterprise 
majority’s disregard of empirical evidence, informal narrowing of 
acceptable compelling state interests, and prioritization of individual 
speech over societal interests might well lead to campaign-finance 
deregulation and yield unprincipled court decisions. This Comment 
 
 61. Id. at 2841. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 2841–42. 
 64. Id. at 2842. 
 65. Id. at 2842–43. 
 66. Id. at 2843. 
 67. Id. at 2844. 
 68. Id. at 2844–45. 
 69. Id. 
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also asserts that this decision’s myopic analytic approach risks the 
piecemeal invalidation of intricate public-financing schemes and 
adversely impacts policy decisions. 
A.  Empiricism Does Matter and Should 
 Not Be Unjustifiably Downplayed 
Arizona Free Enterprise sets problematic precedent in its 
disregard of empirical evidence. In the field of election law, 
empiricism matters and should not be unjustifiably downplayed. Its 
importance is especially acute in regard to campaign-finance-reform 
efforts, which not only contain elements of democratic theory, law, 
and public policy but also depend on empirical political science.70 If 
legislators and policy makers rely on empirical facts to draft laws 
like Arizona’s, then courts should also consider such evidence before 
they make their decisions. 
Despite the importance of empiricism in this field, the Arizona 
Free Enterprise majority offered little empirical evidence to support 
its reasoning.71 For example, in regard to whether the matching funds 
provision burdened political speech, the majority was satisfied that 
“it is never easy to prove a negative.”72 More telling, the majority 
explicitly stated that “we do not need empirical evidence to 
determine that the law at issue is burdensome.”73 
In contrast to the majority’s highly abstract discussion, the 
dissent and the Ninth Circuit more fully engaged the empirical 
evidence. For instance, in finding that the matching funds provision 
did not impose a burden on speech, the dissent relied on several 
statistics that showed that expenditures by candidates and 
independent groups increased since the public financing law was 
enacted.74 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize “mere 
metaphysical threats to political speech as severe burdens” and 
required the plaintiffs to prove that the specter of matching funds 
 
 70. Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist’s Perspective, 32 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1105, 1119 (1999). 
 71. The majority simply cited several plaintiffs’ petitions for certiorari, in which they 
attested that the Act burdened their speech. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2822. 
 72. Id. at 2823 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 2834 n.2 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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actually chilled their speech.75 The Ninth Circuit noted, “No 
Plaintiff . . . has pointed to any specific instance in which she or he 
has declined a contribution or failed to make an expenditure for fear 
of triggering matching funds.”76 Rather, even though he claimed that 
the Act burdened his political speech, one privately financed 
candidate could not recall whether his spending had ever triggered a 
state’s grant of matching funds to an opponent; another privately 
financed candidate instructed his campaign consultant to fundraise as 
much as possible without mentioning concerns of triggering 
matching funds.77 
Aside from its importance to the issue of burdening speech, 
empiricism is also pivotal to a court’s inquiry into a compelling state 
interest.78 Although political scientists have not been able to prove 
conclusively the seemingly obvious fact that money corrupts,79 the 
evidence in Arizona Free Enterprise surely established that 
Arizona’s public funding law was aimed at combating political 
corruption that was caused by campaign contributions.80 While the 
majority quickly dismissed evidence of Arizona’s anticorruption 
rationale, the dissent, like the Ninth Circuit, acknowledged that 
empirical evidence and recognized that Arizona passed the Act in 
response to AzScam.81 Ironically, if the majority had been more 
inclined to consider Arizona’s anticorruption rationale, proof of 
Arizona’s need to combat corruption was literally staring it in the 
face: Arizona senator and key plaintiff in Arizona Free Enterprise 
John McComish, who just that week admitted to being embroiled in 
a campaign-finance scandal, was present in the courtroom during 
oral arguments.82 
 
 75. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 522–23 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom. Ariz. Free 
Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 76. Id. at 523. 
 77. Id. at 524. 
 78. Cain, supra note 70, at 1114–15 (“Defining important state purposes is both a normative 
and an empirical task.”). 
 79. Id. at 1115. 
 80. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2832 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id.; McComish, 611 F.3d at 514, 525; see supra Part III.B. 
 82. Doug Kendall, McComish, the Supreme Court and the Fiesta Bowl Scandal, HUFFPOST 
POLITICS (Apr. 4, 2011, 6:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-kendall/mccomish-the-
supreme-cour_b_844728.html. 
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Overall, the majority’s disregard for empirical evidence not only 
resulted in an unprincipled83 decision in Arizona Free Enterprise but 
also set a worrisome precedent for future campaign-finance cases. 
Arizona Free Enterprise represents the second wave of Supreme 
Court campaign-finance cases that have disregarded empirical 
evidence. The first wave came with what one scholar has called the 
“New Deference Quartet”—four campaign-finance cases in the early 
2000s in which the Court only casually considered empirical 
evidence.84 Scholars have criticized those decisions as unprincipled 
because the Court only paid lip service to satisfying a “quantum of 
empirical evidence.”85 But the Arizona Free Enterprise decision is 
arguably even more unprincipled for its outright statement that 
empirical evidence is unnecessary. 
So why did the Arizona Free Enterprise majority perpetuate a 
disregard for empirical evidence? At least two reasons present 
themselves. The cynical view is that the Justices use evidence merely 
to buttress their “simple value judgments . . . on the wisdom of 
particular campaign finance laws.”86 Another view is that the Court 
may treat evidence somewhat superficially because it has lost faith in 
the kinds of questions that the existing doctrine makes relevant.87 But 
whatever the majority’s reason was for disregarding empirical 
evidence, its decision to do so caused Arizona Free Enterprise to be 
an unprincipled decision and a problematic precedent. 
B.  The Decision Reflects the Roberts Court’s 
 Trend of Narrowing the Acceptable Compelling  
State Interests in Campaign-Finance Cases 
Another troubling aspect of Arizona Free Enterprise is the 
majority’s implicit narrowing of the acceptable compelling state 
interests in campaign finance cases. By way of background, in the 
seminal campaign finance case Buckley, the Court held that 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, unlike 
 
 83. The decision is “unprincipled” in the sense that it is not anchored to the real world and 
can lead a court to implement judicial discretion that is not grounded in fact or law. 
 84. Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Election Law, 57 S.C. 
L. REV. 669, 674–75 (2006). 
 85. See, e.g., id. 
 86. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Empirics of Campaign Finance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 944–45 
(2005). 
 87. Id. at 945. 
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leveling the electoral playing field, is a compelling state interest that 
justifies an infringement on First Amendment rights.88 However, 
while the Justices in Buckley considered corruption in terms of a quid 
pro quo (money for political favors), the word “corruption” itself is 
pliable and susceptible to many meanings.89 The Court took 
advantage of this pliability in the “New Deference Quartet” cases, 
which expanded the definitions of “corruption” and “the appearance 
of corruption” beyond the quid pro quo variety and into the territory 
of more subtle favoritism and undue influence.90 In Davis, the Court 
halted this trend that embraced a broader view of corruption and 
reverted to the Buckley conception of corruption.91 More recently, in 
Citizens United v. FEC,92 the Court clearly circumscribed the 
anticorruption interest, strictly limiting it to the threat of actual quid 
pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.93 
Given this background, Arizona Free Enterprise was seemingly 
yet another instance where the Court restricted the government’s 
anticorruption rationale. There, the majority suggested that 
anticorruption needs should be the major reason, if not the only 
reason, behind a campaign-finance regulation, lest that rationale is 
perceived as illusory.94 Specifically, because the majority discerned 
that one reason behind Arizona’s public-funding law may have been 
to “level the playing field,” it held that the state’s anticorruption 
rationale was illusory and merely a front for a constitutionally 
impermissible reason.95 As the dissent indicated, however, campaign 
finance jurisprudence has never required that anticorruption be the 
state’s only interest; as long as preventing corruption or the 
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appearance of corruption is one valid rationale behind a law, it does 
not matter that another rationale may be an insufficient interest.96 
Despite the dissent’s protest, the majority opinion is binding on 
lower courts. Thus, courts can now more easily strike down 
campaign-finance regulations where combating corruption is not the 
sole rationale and where additional impermissible rationales also 
motivate the law. The ease with which post-Arizona Free Enterprise 
courts can invalidate campaign-finance laws for lack of a “non-
illusory” compelling state interest aligns well with Chief Justice 
Roberts’s political philosophy. According to the Chief Justice, who 
wrote the majority’s opinion, “the political process itself [is] an 
adequate remedy for corruption.”97 Because of Roberts’s belief in the 
self-regulation of the political process, the anticorruption rationale 
will likely continue to become an impotent compelling state interest 
during his tenure on the Court. Given its ongoing circumscription of 
the anticorruption rationale from Davis to Citizens United to Arizona 
Free Enterprise, it is conceivable that the Court will continue to limit 
the rationale to the extent that it supports a burden on First 
Amendment rights in only extremely narrow circumstances. The 
narrowing trend already means that future campaign-finance laws 
will have more difficulty in passing constitutional muster, and it may 
also lead to increased deregulation of campaign finance. 
C.  Prioritizing Individual Speech over Societal Interests Is 
Inconsistent with First Amendment Principles 
The Court’s balancing of First Amendment rights is also 
troubling. The Arizona Free Enterprise majority focused on how the 
Arizona law burdened the speech of individual candidates and 
independent expenditure groups without considering the 
countervailing First Amendment rights of society at large. This 
prioritization of individual speech over societal interests can yield 
nearsighted decisions in future campaign-finance jurisprudence and 
lead to campaign-finance deregulation. 
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The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment was drafted to 
foster democratic self-government, among other reasons.98 Buckley 
recognized this societal aspect of the First Amendment by 
prescribing an “electorate-centered” analytical approach whereby 
“the relationship between First Amendment rights and campaign 
finance should be structured in a way that best serves the 
electorate.”99 The Buckley approach provided a critical foundation 
for upholding public funding regulations because those regulations 
often restrict an individual candidate while they benefit the public.100 
As one commentator has noted, Davis marked a paradigm shift 
“away from the interests of the voting public and toward individual 
candidates.”101 By adopting a “candidate-centered” interpretation of 
First Amendment interests in the campaign-finance context, Davis 
prioritized individual speech over societal interests.102 As a case that 
heavily relied on Davis, Arizona Free Enterprise’s prioritization of 
individual speech over societal interests was not surprising. 
Critics of the First Amendment as protector of societal interests 
have asserted that: 
If the First Amendment can require restrictions on 
individual speech in order to protect democracy-facilitating 
speech-in-the-aggregate, it is left to the courts to decide the 
point at which the restriction on the individual fails to serve 
society’s interests, and also to determine when an individual 
deserves protection despite the fact that such protection may 
be at odds with democratic self-governance.103 
Essentially, these critics claim that an individual-centered First 
Amendment approach is correct simply because it is more 
straightforward.104 However inconvenient it may be to consider 
countervailing societal interests in a First Amendment analysis, such 
interests are an integral part of the First Amendment and should 
therefore have a place in the burden calculus. By adopting the Davis 
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candidate-centered view of the First Amendment, Arizona Free 
Enterprise put a stamp of approval on subverting societal First 
Amendment interests and thus endangered the viability of future 
public-funding schemes. 
D.  A Myopic Approach Can Result 
 in Undesirable Repercussions 
The Court’s myopic approach toward invalidating the matching 
funds provision represents another fundamental reason that Arizona 
Free Enterprise is a disconcerting decision. Whereas the dissent took 
a holistic approach to analyzing the matching funds provision by 
recognizing that the provision was integral to the effectiveness of 
Arizona’s entire public-financing program,105 the majority took a 
myopic approach by isolating that provision and analyzing it in a 
vacuum.106 
The majority’s shortsighted approach has at least two possible 
repercussions. First, it undermines entire campaign-finance schemes 
in Arizona, and by application, elsewhere. Arizona Free Enterprise is 
significant in that it represents a problematic piecemeal approach to 
invalidating an intricate public financing scheme. Although the 
effects of disturbing one part of a multifaceted law cannot be known 
with certainty,107 the Court’s disturbing of Arizona’s matching funds 
provision likely undercuts the state’s entire scheme because the 
provision was “one component that [was] not only attractive but 
necessary to make this type of funding work.”108 Tellingly, at oral 
arguments, Justice Breyer lamented that “it is better to say that it’s 
all illegal than to subject these things to death by a thousand cuts, 
because we don’t know what will happen when we start tinkering 
with one provision rather than another.”109 In this manner, Justice 
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Breyer, as a member of the dissent, stressed that deviating from a 
holistic approach to analyzing such public-financing laws can have 
unintended consequences. 
Arizona Free Enterprise also has far-reaching implications for 
local and national policy decisions. The Court’s decision facilitates 
the ability of other courts to strike down laws that are aimed at both 
curbing political candidates’ dependence on outside money and the 
concomitant threat of corruption. As access to elected officials is 
increasingly linked to wealth, the more likely it is that the civil rights 
of the poor and minorities will be neglected.110 This, in turn, has the 
effect of diminishing the public’s confidence in our democracy and 
of increasing its concerns about special interests.111 Indeed, 
following 2010’s controversial Citizens United ruling, which cleared 
the way for unlimited spending by corporations in federal elections, 
public concerns about special interests is already high.112 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Arizona Free Enterprise’s disregard for empirical evidence, 
informal narrowing of the acceptable compelling state interests, 
prioritization of individual speech over societal interests, and myopic 
analytical approach endanger campaign-finance regulations and 
could lead to unprincipled decisions in future campaign-finance 
cases. If this case is any indicator of the future of campaign-finance 
reform, money talks—and it will have troubling things to say. 
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